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NOTES
WInmTAPPINc-DscRmONARY DENIAL Or PouCEa APPLICATION BY NEW Yoax CoUa.-
In an opinion which excited considerable editorial comment in the New York City
newspapers and various magazines,
1 justice Samuel Hofstadter of the New York
Supreme Court denied an application by the New York City Police Department for
an order permitting the interception of telephone communications for the purpose of
securing evidence of bookmaking.
2
The New York Penal Law expressly prohibits wiretapping by private individuals,
3
but the State Constitution4 and its implementing section in the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure5 permit certain law enforcement officers to apply to designated courts to procure
orders for the interception of telephonic communications upon cause duly shown. Sig-
nificantly, full discretion in granting or denying these applications is vested in the
courts.
In denying the instant application, justice Hofstadter revealed that he had, for
some time past, required that every such wiretapping. application be endorsed by a
ranking officer in the Police Department, and that written reports of the interceptions
1 See, e.g., a joint statement approving this decision issued by the American Civil
Liberties Union and its New York affiliate, the New York Civil Liberties Union, noted
in Civil Liberties, Feb. 1955, p. 2.
2 In the matter of an application for an order permitting the interception of tele-
phone communications of Anonymous, 133 N. Y. L. 3. No. 8, p. 1, col. 7 (Jan. 12,
1955).
3 N. Y. PENAL L. § 552: A person who: 1. Wrongfully obtains or attempts to
obtain, any knowledge of a telegraphic or a telephonic message by connivance with a
clerk, operator, messenger, or other employee of a telegraph or telephone company;
or, 2. Being such clerk, operator, messenger or other employee, wilfully divulges to
anyone but the persons for whom it was intended, the contents or the nature thereof
of a telegraphic or telephonic message or dispatch intrusted to him for the transmission
or delivery . . . is punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by
imprisonment for not more than two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
N. Y. PNAr. L. § 1428: A person who wilfully or maliciously displaces, removes,
injures, or destroys: . . . 6. a line of telegraph or telephone, wire or cable, pier or
abutment, or the material or property belonging thereto, without lawful authority,
or shall unlawfully and wilfully cut, break, tap, or make connection with any telegraph
or telephone line, wire, cable or instrument, or read or copy in any unauthorized man-
ner any message, communication or report passing over it, in this state; . . . 9 . . . is
punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years.
4 N. Y. CoNST. Art I, § 12: The right of the people to be secure against unreason-
able interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated, and
ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is
reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and iden-
tifying the particular means of communication, and particularly describing the person
or persons whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof.
G N. Y. CODE Carr. PROC. § 813-a: An ex parte order for the interception of tele-
graphic or telephonic communications may be issued by any justice of the Supreme
Court or judge of a county court or of the court of general sessions of the County
of New York upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the attorney-
general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police department of the
state or any political subdivision thereof, that there is reasonable ground to believe that
evidence of crime may be thus obtained and identifying the particular telephone line or
means of communication and particularly describing the person or persons whose com-
munications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof. . ..
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be submitted to the court. The Justice noted that these reports had shown ". . . some
arrests and fewer convictions and then rarely, if ever, for a heinous offense.""
Although unauthorized telephone interceptions are prohibited in New York, evi-
dence obtained by virtue of such interceptions is admissible in the New York courts.
7
Further, wiretap evidence has been held admissible even where the order authorizing
the wiretapping is void or irregular.s The United States Supreme Court has held that
wiretapping and the use of evidence obtained thereby does not violate either the un-
reasonable search and seizure proscription9 of the United States Constitution or the
constitutional privilege against self-incriminaton,10 whether such evidence is introduced
in the federal courts,'1 or in the state courts.' 2 However, the federal courts have been
charged with the interpretation and application of Section 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act,13 intended to outlaw wiretapping.
Section 605 was enacted by Congress in 1934 as part of the Enabling Act estab-
lishing the Federal Communications Commission as an independent agency, and reflected
the widespread feeling against wiretapping which existed at that time.14 The United
States Supreme Court was first called upon to interpret Section 605 in 1937 in the case
of Nardone v. United States.15 This was an appeal by several defendants who had been
convicted of liquor smuggling as the result of evidence which had been obtained through
wiretapping procedures engaged in by Federal agents. It was held that the prohibitions
of Section 605 applied to Federal officers, and that evidence obtained in violation of
Section 605 by such officers was inadmissible in a Federal court. In the second Mar-
done case,' 8 the Supreme Court went further, holding that evidence procured by Fed-
eral agents through the use of information obtained from tapping telephone wires was
likewise inadmissible in a Federal court.
However, in Goldman v. United States,'7 in 1942, the use of a sensitive listening
device hung upon the wall of an adjoining room for the purpose of overhearing a
telephone conversation spoken into a receiver was held not to be an interception within
the purview of Section 605.
Goldstein v. United States18 was derided in the same year. This was a mail-fraud
case in which Federal agents persuaded two men to testify in the prosecution of the
defendants by showing them the results of the tapping of their incriminating telephone
conversations. Upon defendant's objection to this evidence, it was held that a person
not a party to a tapped conversation cannot object to its use in court.
6 Supra, note 2.
7 People v. McDonald, 177 App. Div. 806, 165 N. Y. Supp. 41 (2d Dep't 1917);
Matter of Davis, 252 App. Div. 591, 299 N. Y. Supp. 632 (1st Dep't 1937).
8 People v. Katz, 201 Misc. 414, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 360 (Co. Ct. Westchester, 1952).
9 U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
10 U. S. CoNsT. amend. V.
11 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928).
12 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908).
13 47 U. S. C. § 605: No person not being authorized by the sender shall inter-
cept any commmunication and divulge or publish the . . . contents . . . to any person
and no person having received such intercepted communication . . . shall . . . use
the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit
of another.
14 74 Cowo. R c. 2687, 2901 (1931); 75 CoNG. Rzc. 4546, 4733 (1932).
15 302 U. S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314 (1937).
16 308 U. S. 338, 69 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939).
'7 316 U. S. 129, 62 S. Ct. 993, 86 L. Ed. 1322 (1942).
18 316 U. S. 114, 62 S. Ct. 1000, 86 L. Ed. 1312 (1942).
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In 1939, the Supreme Court in Weiss v. United States,19 was called upon to de-
cide whether the prohibitions of Section 605 apply to intra as well as inter-state com-
munications. The Weiss decision held in the affirmative. However, the significance of
that decision was qualified in Schwartz v. United States,2 0 where it was held that evi-
dence obtained through violation of Section 605 might still be received in state courts.
The Supreme Court took the position that Section 605 was not intended to impose a
rule of evidence upon the state courts.
Justice Hofstadter's opinion expresses the view that wiretapping in any form is
the greatest possible invasion of the right of privacy-a right which is "part of the
expanding concept of the individual's right to be free from unwarranted intrusion,"2 1
and which is recognized by the New York Civil Rights Law.2 2 The dissenting opinions
of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in the Olmstead case2 3 pointed out the dangers in-
herent in wiretapping and its encroachment upon American ideals. In the words of
Justice Holmes, "as a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are
but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared to wiretapping.
'2 4
Wiretapping by Federal agencies is thought, in some quarters, to be widespread 25
despite the federal prohibitions against such practice. Illegal wiretapping by individuals
and private detective agencies has been dramatically revealed in recent days during the
course of legislative investigations in New York City. Also in New York, the counsel
to a private anti-crime organization was held in contempt for failure to disclose to
a grand jury the identity of persons who gave him information concerning illegal
wiretapping.2 0
While arguments for and against official wiretapping continue to be raised,
2 7 its
present legality in New York necessitates the exercise of judicial discretion as each
application is made to the courts by the police department. The New York judges are
required to weigh conflicting values.28 The search for a standard in the exercise of dis-
cetion conferred by statute continues. It should be noted that this discretion is a pro-
cedural safeguard, a device much favored in American law.2 9 The Justice in the
instant case warns that future wiretap applications in connection with so minor a
crime as bookmaking will be denied because "the sacrifice is disproportionate to the
possible gain."
REs JUDICATA-AcTION BY EeLoYER AGAn sT INsuRE:R ON FImzrrY FoLIcY HELD
BARRED BY PREvIous REcovERY AGAINST EMPLOYE FOR ONE DoLLAR.-In Virginia Metal
Products Corporation v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the dismissal by the District
19 308 U. S. 321, 60 S. Ct. 269, 84 L. Ed. 298 (1939).
20 344 U. S. 199, 73 S. Ct. 232, 97 L. Ed. 231 (1952).
21 Supra, note 2.
22 N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS L. §§ 50-51.
23 Supra, note 9.
24 Supra, note 9, at 476, 48 S. Ct. 564, 571, 72 L. Ed. 944, 955.
25 Tim WRET=APERS (New York, 1955). This is a series of articles published in
The Reporter magazine by the Fortnightly Publishing Co., Inc.
28 People v. Keating, 133 N. Y. L. J. No. 121, p. 1, col. 1 (June 22, 1955).
27 E.g., Wiretapping: An Unnecessary Evil and Wiretapping: A Realistic Appraisal,
both in 18 T)3z SHINGLE 1, (The Philadelphia Bar Association, February, 1955).
28 Westin, The Wiretapping Problem, 52 CoL. L. Rxv. 165 (1952).
29 McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
1 219 F. 2d 931 (2d Cir. 1955).
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Court for the Southern District of New York of an action on a fidelity policy.brought
by an employer against its insurer for losses resulting from an alleged misappropriation
by an employee. In an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the court held that the plain-
tiff employer was barred by a previous judgment for one dollar recovered against the
employee for the same conduct.
Virginia Metal, in a proof of claim filed with Hartford in April, 1949, charged its
treasurer, Taylor, with misappropriation, including the conversion of checks and the
submission of fraudulent travel vouchers. Thereafter, in November, 1949, Virginia
Metal brought an action in the New York Federal District Court against Hartford
upon the fidelity policy insuring Virginia Metal against losses through fraudulent or
dishonest acts of its employees. In November, 1953, the complaint was summarily
dismissed, 2 and an appeal was taken.
In August, 1950, after the New York action was begun and before the appeal was
taken, Taylor sued Virginia Metal for libel and slander in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.3 In that proceeding, Virginia Metal pleaded
five counterclaims based upon the misconduct alleged in the New York action, praying
damages in the amounts of the funds allegedly misappropriated. The verdict was in
favor of the defendant, Virginia Metal, on both the complaint and counterclaim. How-
ever, the jury only awarded nominal damages in the sum of one dollar. Both parties
made motions to set aside the verdict, and both motions were overruled.
Virginia Metal objected on the ground that the damages were inadequate. The
Virginia court ruled, however, that the jury had acted within its scope as trier of the
facts in awarding nominal damages. Testimony as to the amount, as well as to the
existence, of Taylor's indebtedness had -been highly conflicting, and the court, in its
discretion, saw fit to leave undisturbed the jury's finding, which the court labeled as a
yerdict for Taylor "perversely . . . expressed." 4
The appeal was decided in May, 1953, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.3 On the basis of the holding below that the finding was, in effect,
for Taylor, the employee contended that he had been exonerated of the alleged mis-
appropriation. He thus argued that he was entitled to judgment and further hearings
as to damages. On this point the court held that the finding of nominal damages
only for Virginia Metal did not amount to a finding that the charges against Taylor
were false. The jury may have thought the company had not established the amount
of damages it had sustained with sufficient certainty to justify the awarding of any
more than nominal damages. Judgment was affirmed for Virginia Metal, the de-
fendant, both as to the complaint and counterclaim. The effect of this holding was
to limit the liability of Taylor to Virginia Metal for the alleged misconduct to nominal
damages, and to allow the lower finding, "perversely ... expressed" for Taylor, to
stand.
In February, 1955, after the proceedings in Virginia were completed, the appeal of
Virginia Metal in the New York action against the defendant bonding company on
the fidelity policy was decided.8 In that appeal, the issue was whether the previous
2 Virginia Metal Products Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., Civil
No. 53-186, S. D. N. Y., Nov. 2, 1953. Not reported.
3 Taylor v. Virginia Metal Products Corp., 111 F. Supp. 321 (E. D. Va. 1952).
4 Rawle v. McIlhenny, 163 Va. 735, 750, 177 S. E. 214, 221 (1934).
r Taylor v. Virginia Metal Products Corp., 204 F. 2d 457 (4th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U. S. 865, 98 L. Ed. 375, 74 S. Ct. 104 (1953).
6 Virginia Metal Products Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 219 F. 2d
931 (2d Cir. 1955).
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judgment for one dollar which Virginia Metal had recovered against its employee,
would operate as a bar in an action on the policy to recover for losses allegedly suf-
fered as a result of the same misconduct.
Estoppel by judgment requires that the issues in the second action be the same
as those in the first, and that the parties in the second action be the, same or the
privies of the parties to the first action. 7 The misconduct of Taylor was the issue
at bar in both the Virginia and New York actions, and thus the first requirement of
estoppel was satisfied. The fact that the counterclaim of Virginia Metal against Taylor
in the Virginia action was $90,000 (the amount of the alleged misappropriation),
whereas the New York action against the insurer was for $50,000, the amount stipu-
lated in the fidelity bond, is immaterial insofar as estoppel is concerned.8
The question then arose as to whether the second requirement of estoppel was
satisfied, since the defendants in the successive actions were not identical. However,
parties in such successive actions need not be identical, provided there is privity or
identity of interest.9
"What is privity? As used when dealing with the estoppel of a judgment, privity
denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same right of property."'10 Even
that was lacking in the actions in question. "Plaintiff contends that res judicata does
not apply because there is no privity between defendant and Taylor. Defendant con-
cedes privity is lacking.,11" Thus the court could not find an estoppel based upon a
pivity or mutuality concept.
It is a general principle that an estoppel based upon a prior judgment must be
mutual; that is, available to both parties.12 There is an apparent exception to the
rule of mutuality where liability is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one
of the parties exonerated in a prior suit, based upon the same facts and involving the
same parties.' 3 In such cases, this exception to the mutuality rule avoids the injustice
which might otherwise result if recovery against one party were allowed based upon
the conduct of another, when that other had been exonerated in a previous action.14
The requirements of unilateral estoppel had to be met if there was to be any
estoppel at all, for the insurer was neither a party to the action in Virginia, nor was
he in privity with Taylor. "Its position was that recovery was dependent upon Tay-
lor's culpability, and Taylor, having been exonerated by the judgment on the counter-
claim, that judgment inured to defendant's benefit and was a bar to this action even
though defendant was not a party to the counterclaim and there was no privity be-
7 S0 C. J. S., Judgment § 686 (1947).
8 5o C. J. S., Judgment § 712 (1947).
9 Eissing Chemical Co. v. People's National Bank of Brooklyn, 205 App. Div.
89, 92, 199 N. Y. Supp. 342, 345 (2d Dept. 1923), aff'd, 237 N. Y. 532, 143 N. E. 731
(1924).
1o Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U. S. 111, 128,
129, 56 L. Ed. 1009, 1024, 32 S. Ct. 641, 660 (1912).
11 Brief for Appellee, p. 7, Virginia Metal Products Corp. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., 219 F. 2d 931 (2d Cir. 1955).
12 Atlantic Dry Dock Co. v. New York, 53 N. Y. 64 (1873); 50 C. J. S., judgment
§ 765 (1947).
13 Adriaanse v. United States, 184 F. 2d 968 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Lafoon v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 111 F. Supp. 923, 928, 929 (S. D. N. Y. 1953); RESTATEmENT, JuDn-
WXNT § 99 (1942).
14 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U. S. 111, 127,
128, 56 L. Ed. 1009, 1024, 32 S. Ct. 641, 659 (1912). 50 C. J. S., Judgment § 765
(1947).
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tween it and Taylor."15 Since it fell within the exception to the rule of mutuality, the
estoppel, though unilateral, was held valid. The court pointed out the particular
nature of the exception: "Fidelity insurance is only one form of secondary liability,
the primary liability being that of the employee to the insured."'16 Judge Hand further
disclosed the rationale of the exception: "It is the well-settled doctrine in New York,
as well as elsewhere, that a party secondarily liable for the culpable conduct of a third
person, after paying the loss, may sue that person as surrogate of the obligee; and
that any act of the obligee that impairs this right discharges the party secondarily
liable, at least to the extent of the impairment.
' 17
In so explaining the estoppel rule invoked in the instant case, the court disposed
of difficulties in the underlying fact pattern. A unilateral estoppel requires that the
person primarily liable must have been exonerated in a prior action. In the Virginia
courts, nominal damages for the employer was held to be, in effect, a finding for
Taylor.1 8 Even if this might not be considered strict exoneration (since judgment was
for the employer) the reasoning of the court is sure: "It is true that the judgment
was not against the [employer], but in his favor. However, that is immaterial, because
it fixed beyond dispute the amount that the [employer] could recover from Taylor
and as effectively barred any further recovery from him by the [insurer] as surrogate
of the [employer], as though it had dismissed the claim altogether."' 9
The judgment for nominal damages, rendered against Taylor in the Virginia action,
limited Taylor's liability for the misconduct in question, thereby limiting the secondary
liability of the insurer and discharging him to that extent at least.20 The employer
was barred or estopped from an action against the insurer based upon the policy-
covered misconduct of an employee who had been made impervious, through judgment,
to all but nominal liability.
In New York, mutuality of estoppel is an accepted doctrine. It has been held that
a judgment in favor of one co-trespasser may not be used by another co-trespasser,
not a party to that judgment, by way of estoppel. "The estoppel must be mutual, which
it is not in this case."2 1 Unilateral exceptions to the rule, however, have been allowed
in New York. It has been held that section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law imposes
a relationship akin to that of master and servant, and that this relationship fails within
the scope of unilateral estoppel. 2 2 The connection between indemnitor and indemnitee
has also been held to come within the exception to the mutuality rule.23 There has been
unwillingness to extend the area of the exception to cases where the plea of res judicata
has been used other than as a defense, or in support of a counterclaim or to establish
liability affirmatively.2 4 In a case involving an indemnitor-indemnitee relationship, the
court held: "One derivatively liable may plead in defense a judgment for the one
'5 Brief for Appellee, p. 7, Virginia Metal Products Corp. v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co., 219 F. 2d 931 (2d Cir. 1955).
16 219 F. 2d 931, 933.
17 219 F. 2d 931, 933.
18 Rawle v. McIlhenny, 163 Va. 735, 750, 177 S. E. 214, 221 (1934).
19 219 F. 2d 931, 933.
20 RYSTATrmn NT, SECuRIrY § 139, subd. 1 (1941).
21 Atlantic Dry Dock Co. v. New York, 53 N. Y. 64, 68 (1873).
22 Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14, 9 N. E. 2d 758
(1937).
23 American Surety Co. v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 18 F. Supp. 750 (S. D. N. Y.
1937).




primarily liable in a previous action by the same plaintiff, to which one was not a
party, but may not make a judgment the basis of a claim or counterclaim.'
5
In the case under consideration, there was an effective unilateral estoppel by judg-
ment, and after that judgment, neither the fact of, nor the extent of liability of the
person primarily liable (Taylor) can be relitigated by Virginia Metal or its insurer.
WoRxM 's COiPENSATIO-APPEAL By CLAMANT To VACATE AwARD TO ENABSLn II
To PROCEED AGAINST EMPLOER 3N ComrmroN LAW NEGLm'c.---"This is an unusual
workmen's compensation case, since here it is the permanently disabled workman who
appeals from an order affirming an award to himself."1 An injured workman, in
Matter of Doca v. Federal Stevedoring Co., Inc., and Workmen's Compensation Board,2
brought this appeal seeking to have vacated a compensation award, in order that he
might bring a common law negligence action against his employer. The theory under-
lying this latter action is that Doca was injured by one of his fellow-employees at
Federal Stevedoring while he (Doca) was outside his employment, having finished his
work for the day.3 The employer's compensation carrier maintained that the injury
was compensable under the workmen's compensation laws, it being presumed that the
reason behind this assertion was that the same company was the carrier on the em-
ployer's general liability policy.4
The facts in the case were never in dispute. Doca, a longshoreman, had checked
out and departed from work at a Brooklyn pier. He was passing another pier on his
way home, when he was run down and severely injured by an auto crane belonging
to his employer, Federal. The next day, Federal filed the first of several reports of
injury with the Board. No claim or report was ever submitted by Doca. The Board,
after giving notice to all parties, held a hearing, at which none of the parties appeared,
and on the basis of the employer's reports and several physidans' reports, found the
accident and injury to be compensable.
Despite the fact that he received and accepted substantial payments for medical
expenses, Doca sought to recover in a common law negligence action. The trial court
denied a motion to dismiss the complaint, and the order was affirmed by the Appellate
Division.5 The Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that Doca could not attack
the Board's finding in this collateral manner.6 Doca then brought an appeal from the
findings of the Board itself. The Appellate Division, from whose decision the instant
appeal was taken, sustained the Board's finding. 7
In his appeal to the Court of Appeals, Doca's contentions were: (1) that the
Board lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Doca had never filed a claim; and
25 Kearns Coal Co. v. U. S. Fed. Guaranty Co., 118 F. 2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 313 U. S. 579, 85 L. Ed. 1536, 61 S. Ct. 1099 (1941).
1 Judge Desmond's opening remark in Matter of Doca v. Federal Stevedoring Co.,
Inc., and Workmen's Compensation Board, 308 N. Y. 44, 47, 123 N. E. 2d 632, 633
(1954).
2 308 N. Y. 44, 123 N. E. 2d 632 (1954).
3 Id. at 48, 123 N. E. 2d at 633.
4 Ibid.
5 Dora v. Federal Stevedoring Co., 280 App. Div. 940, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 25 (2d
Dept. 1953).
6 305 N. Y. 648, 112 N. E. 2d 424 (1953).
7 284 App. Div. 46, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 172 (3d Dept. 1954).
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(2) that even if the Board had had jurisdiction, there was no residuum of legal evi-
dence supporting the finding.
The Court disposed of Doca's claim that the Board lacked jurisdiction by reference
to the case of Meaney v. Keatings which interpreted the language of Section 20 of the
Workmen's Compensation Law. This section provides in part that "a claim for com-
pensation may be presented to the employer or to the chairman" of the Board, and
that the Board shall have jurisdiction over claims "presented to it." In the Meaney
case, the Court held that a notice of injury filed by the employer constituted a "claim"
within the meaning of Section 20, and that therefore the Board had acquired juris-
diction, despite the fact that the injured worker had never filed a claim himself. Apply-
ing this authority to the Doca case, the Court held that the Board had, as a matter
of law, acquired jurisdiction.
Addressing itself to the major issue, the Court held, five to two, that sufficient evi-
dence had been presented. However, the court glossed over the questions as to the
existence of a "residuum of legal evidence." 9
New York entered the field of workmen's compensation legislation 45 years, ago,
with the enactment of a Workmen's Compensation Act,10 which was invalidated by
the Court of Appeals a year later.'1 The present Workmen's Compensation law,
enacted in 191312, secured to those workmen covered by its provisions an insurance
system of compensation for industrial accidents, thus freeing them from the necessity
of relying on the chance remedy of protracted and oftentimes speculative litigation;
and depriving the employer of certain defenses that were available to him at common
law.13 In the following year, the Legislature added Article I, Section 19 to the New
York State Constitution to remove any doubt as to the constitutionality of the 1913
enactment. After the constitutional amendment, the Workmen's Compensation Law
was reenacted by L. 1914, c. 41.
The liberal social policy of the statute is well illustrated by the presumptions it
creates in favor of the injured workman. Section 21 provides in part that, "In any
proceedings for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter, it
shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary (1) that the
claim comes within the provisions of this chapter."
Nor need the Board observe the strict courtroom rules of procedure: it "shall not
be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules
of procedure... "'14
The problem which arose in the Doca case is one which inevitably arises when a
finding by an administrative or quasi-judicial Board is brought to a court of law for
review: what "support" must the Board's finding have in the record in order that these
findings be upheld by the court? Chief justice Hughes said that a court should insist
upon "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." 15 judge Learned Hand said that such a finding must be "supported
8 305 N. Y. 660, 112 N. E. 2d 763 (1953).
9 SuPra, note 2 at 49, 123 N. E. 2d 632, 636.
10 L. 1910, c. 674.
11 Ives v. South Buffalo R. R., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911).
12 L. 1913, c. 816.
13 Contributory Negligence, Assumption of Risk and the Fellow Servant Rule were
the important common law defenses abolished. See Prosser, LAW OF TORTS, c. 2, 520
(St. Paul, 1941).
14 N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law, § 118.
10 In Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 229, 59 Sup. Ct. 206,
217, 83 L. Ed. 126, 140 (1938).
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by the kind of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious
affairs."16
The basic rule in New York was announced in Matter of Carroll v. Knkker-
bocker,1 7 a compensation case decided three years after the enactment of the statute.
In the Carroll case, the Court reversed a death award on the ground that the finding
of the Board was based wholly on hearsay reports of statements made by the deceased
worker. The rule as announced in the Carroll case was that the Commission "may
in its discretion accept any evidence that is offered, [but] in the end there must be a
residuum of legal evidence to 9upport the claim before an award can be made.' 18
(Emphasis supplied). But did the Court of Appeals apply this rule in the Doca case?
Judge Desmond wrote that the "[residuum] rule has no place here. It governs when
the party against whom the award is made questions the sufficiency of the proof but
that is not our question." 19
In Matter of Ahern, v. South Buffalo Ry. Co.,2o the Court of Appeals held that the
acquiescence of an employer in an award, even when the jurisdictional facts were not
present, bound the employer. Further, in Matter of Bollard v. Engel,2 1 the Court
found that appropriate statements in an employer's reports of injury are probative evi-
dence against an employer that the accident arose out of and in the course of employ-
ment. Taking cognizance of these decisions, Judge Desmond held there was "no con-
trolling reason why such statements are not equally probative as against the claimant
when his attention is called to them and when he is given notice that findings and an
award are to be based on them, and he still makes no protest but accepts the compensa-
tion."22 Dwelling on the "acquiescence" theme, Judge Desmond pointed out that the
employee had had ample notice of all the facts and proceedings involved in the ad-
ministrative determination of the matter. The employee knew that the Compensation
Board had had before it a "showing" in the form of employer's notices and physician's
reports. The Board had informed him that this was a compensable accident, and that
it intended to make a finding that his accident arose out of and in the course of his
employment. The employee had made no protest until long after several awards had
been made and after he had received compensation payments totaling $2,400, and had
had his medical and hospital bills paid by the carrier to the extent of $14,000. In
view of this "he [Doca] cannot now be heard to question the fact." 23 The court,
speaking through Judge Desmond, made no mention of accord and satisfaction, estoppel,
waiver or public policy as being the possible basis or bases for this conclusion. "Aa-
quiescence" was the closest approach.
On the other hand, the minority, speaking through Judge Froessel, contended that
there was nothing in the record to support the Board's jurisdictional finding.2 4 Taking
direct issue with the majority, Judge Froessel agreed that such matters as claimant's
failure to appear at the hearings, his acceptance of the compensation awards, the pre-
sumption allowed by Section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, and uncorrobo-
16 In N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938).
'7 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916).
18 Id. at 440, 113 N. E. at 509 (1916).
19 Supra, note 2 at 52, 123 N. E. 2d 632, 636.
19 Supra, note 2 at 52, 123 N. E. 2d 632, 636.
20 303 N. Y. 545, 104 N. E. 2d 898 (1952), aff'd, 344 U. S. 367, 73 Sup. Ct. 340,
97 L. Ed. 395 (1953).
21 278 N. Y. 463, 17 N. E. 2d 130 (1938).
22 Supra, note 2 at 53, 123 N. E. 2d 632, 636.
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 55, 123 N. E. 2d at 637.
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rated hearsay reports are not evidence (emphasis supplied by Judge Froessel). There-
fore, they have no probative effect.2 5 The employer's report of injury, which is proba-
tive evidence against the employer on the jurisdictional issue, was, according to the
majority, equally probative against the employee. 26 Judge Froessel, however, pointed
out that such a report binds an employer because it is his admission, and is, therefore,
within a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule. When this same report is
offered against the employee, no such exception should obtain 2 7 He was also careful
to note that the majority cited no authority for the proposition that the accident
report of the employer was probative evidence against the employee.
2 8
25 Ibid.
26 Supra, note 22.
27 Supra, note 24.
28 Ibid.
